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Abstract—This paper compares the risk factors for becoming 
a victim of two types of phishing: high-tech phishing (using 
malicious software) and low-tech phishing (using e-mails and 
telephone calls). These risk factors are linked to possibilities for 
situational crime prevention. Data from a cybercrime victim 
survey in the Netherlands (n=10,316) is used. Based on routine 
activity theory, the multivariate analyses include thirty variables. 
There are many similarities between the two types of attacks. 
Both have almost the same crime script, for example. 
Furthermore, analyses show that both criminal groups are happy 
with almost any victim they can get and do not discriminate 
between the rich and poor. There are also differences between 
high- and low-tech victimization. First, almost none of the online 
visibility variables had any effect on the risk of becoming victim 
to low-tech attacks. Victims of high-tech attacks tell a different 
story. There is a clear connection between victimization and 
spending time in the online world. The second difference can be 
found within online accessibility. Again, none of the variables 
mattered when it came to the low-tech attacks. The malware 
analysis, however, shows that the victims’ technical 
infrastructure does affect the risk of victimization. The findings 
show situational crime prevention has to be aimed at groups 
other than just the users themselves. Criminals are primarily 
interested in popular online places and the onus is on the owners 
of these virtual places to protect their visitors from getting 
infected. 
Keywords—malware; phishing; cybercrime; situational crime 
prevention 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Everybody is at risk when it comes to phishing 
victimization.
1
  This conclusion was drawn last year by 
Leukfeldt based upon an analysis of phishing victims. [1]  The 
conclusion was both disappointing and intriguing. 
Disappointing because no one, clearly defined group could be 
pinpointed who are at increased risk of victimization. This 
makes target hardening a lot more difficult and limits specific 
prevention campaigns aimed at particular groups, e.g. those 
who engage in dangerous online activities. Intriguing because, 
based on routine activity theory, it was expected that, besides 
financial characteristics (value), online activities (visibility) 
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 Phishing is the process aimed at finding out users' 
personal information by posing as a trusted authority using 
such digital means as e-mail. 
and online accessibility in particular would play a role in 
determining the extent to which someone is a suitable target for 
these internet fraudsters. 
Not one of the “digital” equivalents of visibility and 
accessibility, however, seemed to matter. The paper concluded 
that phishers apparently do not select their victims based on the 
digital trail victims leave when engaging in online activities, 
nor do they search for technical flaws in operating systems or 
browsers to get to users. A possible explanation was that it is 
the phisher’s tactic to approach large groups of potential 
victims through, for example, spam. In this way, a fraudster 
can basically reach anybody with an internet connection and an 
e-mail account. 
A recent study into phishing networks shows a phishing 
group which does indeed use such a method. [2] The group 
sends out as many e-mails as possible to Dutch citizens. In the 
e-mail it is stated that the security of their internet banking 
account needs to be updated or the account will be closed.
2
  All 
the receiver has to do is click on the link in the e-mail to go to 
the bank’s secure website. Of course, this is a fake bank 
website under the control of the criminals. Once someone tries 
to log in, this information goes to the criminals. From this 
moment on, the criminals have access to the bank accounts of 
the victims. Due to a layered security policy, however, the 
criminals are not yet able to transfer money from these 
accounts. This requires unique transaction authentication 
codes. The phisher then simply makes a telephone call to 
victims to try to obtain these codes. The caller poses as a bank 
employee and claims to need that code in order to complete the 
new security settings. Information from the victim’s bank 
account is used to gain trust (e.g. the first (spam) e-mail about 
the new security, but also the type of account, registered 
names, last transactions, etc.). 
The modus operandi outlined above supports the 
conclusion from the 2014 article that phishers use a trawling 
method. [1] Indeed, these phishers did not select their victims 
based on the digital trail they leave when engaging in online 
activities, nor did they seek for technical flaws in operating 
systems or browsers. Overall, technology (in this case the 
internet, e-mail and websites) is only used in the early stage of 
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 Or a similar message. The goal is to make the person 
click on the link in the e-mail. 
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the crime. A major part of the crime script consists of using 
social engineering on victims. This explains why digital 
equivalents of the traditional elements of the routine activity 
theory show no effect on victimization. 
The study into phishing networks [2], however, also shows 
that other types of networks exist. These criminals do rely 
heavily on technology to execute their attacks. They use 
malware
3
,  not only to steal user credentials but also to 
intercept transaction authentication methods or to alter transfers 
that victims have made. Indeed, these attacks depend more on 
technology than on social engineering. This raises the question 
whether the digital versions of the routine activity theory 
elements – value, inertia, visibility and accessibility (VIVA) –
play a role within malware victimization. 
A subsequent 2015 study  into the applicability of routine 
activity theory to cybercrimes
4
 indeed shows that digital 
equivalents of VIVA affect the risk of becoming a victim of 
malware [3]. This paper brings these two studies together, 
compares the risk factors, tries to explain the differences 
between the two types of offences and discusses which 
situational crime prevention methods are most suitable for the 
prevention of both low-tech and high-tech phishing.  
Firstly, Section 2 briefly describes the expectations based 
upon routine activity theory. The data and methods are 
described in Section 3. Section 4 contains a description of the 
risk factors of malware victimization. Furthermore, the results 
of phishing and malware victimization are compared. The last 
section contains a conclusion and discussion about the 
differences and similarities between the two types of attacks, 
their victims and possibilities for situational crime prevention. 
II. SUITABLE TARGETS: EXPECTATIONS BASED ON ROUTINE 
ACTIVITY THEORY
5
 
This paper uses routine activity theory to find 
characteristics or behavior of victims which makes them more 
attractive to criminals. Routine activity theory claims that 
opportunity structures influence the prevalence of deviant 
behavior. [4] These structures are influenced by the 
combination of the presence of a motivated offender and a 
suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian. There 
are four elements that determine the extent to which a victim 
appeals to a motivated offender: value, inertia, visibility and 
accessibility. Below, a brief description is given of each 
element and its digital equivalent, followed by the hypothesis. 
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 Malware is short for malicious software. Examples 
include viruses, worms, trojan horses and spyware. 
4
 The focus of this study was not to identify risk factors, 
but to examine whether the classic elements (value, inertia, 
visibility and accessibility) of routine activity theory can still 
be used as a framework to study cybercrime. 
5
 This paper compares the results of malware victimization 
with the findings of an earlier study. Hence, the same 
theoretical framework is used and the same variables will be 
used to test the hypotheses. This section, therefore, contains 
only a brief summary of the expectations based on the routine 
activity in the 2014 and 2015 study. [1][3] 
The first element is value. Offenders are particularly 
interested in goals to which they assign value for whatever 
reason. In the case of phishing, the size of a bank account may 
be interesting as the profit potential is higher. Studies show 
households with higher incomes are more at risk of becoming 
victims of identity theft. [5][6] 
 
• H1: Victims have significantly higher income and 
financial assets than non-victims. 
 
The second element is inertia. Traditionally, inertia is 
described simply as the weight of the item. Small electronic 
goods, for example, are easier to steal than heavy cumbersome 
objects. In the case of information theft, this seldom applies 
(only with extremely large databases, at most). For this reason, 
the multivariate analysis excluded inertia. 
Visibility is the third element. Visibility refers to the 
conspicuousness of objects criminals want, for example, 
expensive items in a living room that can be seen from the 
street. A number of studies on cybercrimes show online 
activities such as downloading or spending time in online chat 
boxes contribute to making someone a suitable target simply 
because they increase visibility. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [19] [22] 
[23] [24] In the case of phishing and malware, the question is 
which (and to what extent) online activities actually provide 
suitable targets. Respondents were asked to indicate what 
activities they conducted online (and how frequently). These 
were later classified in two categories: activities with a low or 
high level of online visibility. Activities within the first 
category are e-mail, targeted browsing and using direct 
messaging platforms like online messaging services and 
Skype. Activities in the second category are untargeted 
browsing, using online chat rooms, online gaming, online 
buying, actively using internet forums, active social 
networking and twittering. 
 
• H2: Victims conduct significantly more highly 
visible online activities than non-victims. 
 
The last element is accessibility. Accessibility is related to 
the construction of communities, placing goods in easily 
accessible locations and other features of everyday life that 
make it easy for offenders to come into contact with their 
target. Accessibility is also relevant in the online world. Users 
need software, such as operating systems and web browsers, to 
enter the online world. Motivated offenders abuse weaknesses 
in software to attack users. A relatively large group of 
motivated offenders is constantly trying to find new 
weaknesses in software and shares information on (potential) 
holes on forums (a number of studies describe these forums). 
[12][13][14[15][16] Indeed, so much is known about abusing 
weaknesses in popular software that users of popular software 
are more accessible to criminals than users of less popular 
software. 
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• H3: Victims use popular (commonly used) operating 
systems and web browsers significantly more often than non-
victims. 
 
There are also factors which make potential victims less 
accessible for attackers. There is, for example, anti-virus 
software which protects users against malware. Users become 
less accessible to a criminal when they take protective 
measures by installing and updating antivirus software. 
Furthermore, technical knowledge might also be a protective 
factor. The less users know about the software and equipment 
they use, the less they know about the risks they run. In 
addition, the victim’s awareness of online risks may also 
determine their accessibility. Internet users who are aware of 
the risks they run online are better able to anticipate risk and 
are therefore less likely to become victims. [10][11] 
 
• H4: Victims have significantly less up-to-date 
antivirus software than non-victims. 
• H5: Victims have a significantly lower level of 
computer literacy than non-victims. 
• H6: Victims have a significantly lower level of risk 
awareness than non-victims. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
Both the phishing and malware analyses are based upon a 
secondary analysis of a Dutch cybercrime victim survey [17].  
The representative sample included 10,314 respondents 
(response rate of 47%). The malware analysis involved 8,378 
respondents (89%) who used the internet and answered 
questions about malware infections. Furthermore, data from 
the SSB (Social Statistical Database) of Statistics Netherlands 
was used in order to gain insight into the financial situation of 
respondents. See Arts and Hoogteijling for a detailed 
description [18].   
The dependent variable – phishing victim – was coded 
dichotomously (1=victim, 0=no victim). Respondents were 
asked about phishing attacks that resulted in financial damage 
in the last twelve months. Of the 9,163 respondents who 
reported using the internet, 53 were victims of phishing 
(0.6%). 
The dependent variable – malware victim – was also coded 
dichotomously (1=victim, 0=not a victim). Respondents were 
asked whether they had noted during the past twelve months 
that malware was present on their computer. Response options 
were: “yes”, “no” and “I do not know”. Of the 9,163 
respondents who used the internet, 16.7 percent reported 
having malware on their computer(s). 
The independent variables were: (1) sociodemographic 
traits such as gender, age, marital status, educational level 
(coded in eight categories from ‘no education’ to ‘university 
education’) and employment (12 hours per week or more); (2) 
additional financial data (personal income, household income, 
value of financial assets, amount of savings), added in 
collaboration with Statistics Netherlands. More about this in 
the next paragraph (3) frequency of online activities, rated by 
respondents on a four point scale; and finally (4), accessibility 
factors, such as computer skills (a composite variable of 
knowledge about the used operating system, internet 
connection, web browser and virus scanner) and risk 
awareness (a composite variable of ten propositions, such as: 
“I open attachments or files from unknown senders” and “I 
use different passwords for different accounts”). Other factors 
include type of operating system, web browser, and possessing 
an up-to-date virus scanner.  
To gain insight into the financial situation of respondents, 
data from the SSB (Social Statistical Database) of Statistics 
Netherlands were linked to the dataset of Domenie et al 
(2013). The SSB is a database which is not publically 
accessible. It is only accessible to members of Dutch 
Universities. It consist of more than 40 linkable records about 
various subjects which are mutually matched. Data is provided 
to Statistics Netherlands by different government agencies like 
the police, IRS and social welfare agencies. A detailed 
explanation of the composition of the SSB files is given by 
Arts and Hoogteijling [18]. In order to link datasets with data 
from the SBB, a social security number or name and address is 
required. Statistics Netherlands then creates a so-called RIN 
number (an internal person identification number) to link data 
to individuals from different files. The researcher is then able 
to analyze data on a new file which is managed by Statistics 
Netherlands, and from which the social security number and / 
or name and address have been removed. Statistics 
Netherlands checks the output because any information which 
can be made publically may not be traceable to individual 
persons.;  
Like any research, a number of comments can be made on 
the analyzed data. First of all, victim surveys rely on the 
answers of respondents. It might not be easy for respondents 
to distinguish phishing and malware attacks form each other.  
Furthermore, only online activities have been studied. Perhaps 
offline activities or psychological characteristics (also) play a 
role in phishing victimization. The dataset of the Dutch 
cybercrime survey [17] and additional data sets from Statistics 
Netherlands, however, did not provide such information. 
Other studies have found evidence that offline behavior does 
influence online victimization. [19] In addition, in previous 
research, a link with other theories was found, such as the self-
control theory. Although self-control is rooted in offender 
studies, there is growing evidence that self-control also affects 
victimization [21][22]. In future studies, both offline behavior 
and such theories should be integrated in order to understand 
victimization better. 
Finally, a comment on the usefulness of the presented 
multivariate analysis for (police) practice. The data of this 
article was collected in 2011. The (technical) developments 
within the cybercrime field take place with great speed. This 
also applies to a crime form such as phishing. To perform a 
successful phishing attack, criminals at all times use social 
engineering (persuading a user to do something which they 
normally would not do, for example, giving information about 
their internet banking account), whether or not combined with 
malware (an email with an infected attachment or a website 
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where the visitor's computer is infected). Trend reports show 
an increase in the use of malware by phishers. Perhaps now or 
in the future, other risk factors play a role. 
 
IV. SUITABLE TARGETS: RISK FACTORS COMPARED 
Table 1 shows the results of both the multivariate analysis 
of phishing and malware victims. Even at first glance, it is 
clear there are differences between the two. Below the results 
are described for each of the elements of routine activity 
theory included in the analysis (value, visibility and 
accessibility). 
 
A. Value (hypothesis 1) 
Financial characteristics of respondents do not play a role 
in phishing victimization. None of the variables related to 
someone’s wealth (e.g. income or savings) explains an 
increased or decreased risk of phishing victimization. Table 1 
shows that most of the financial characteristics do not play a 
role within malware victimization either. One variable, 
however, is related to the risk of becoming a victim: the level 
of someone’s personal income. The effect, however, is not in 
the expected direction: the lower the personal income, the 
higher the probability of becoming a victim. Why a lower 
income increases the risk of malware victimization is unclear. 
This should be the subject of further research. 
The analysis clearly shows that phishing attacks (both low-
tech and high-tech) are not only aimed at potential victims 
with high levels of funds in their bank account. Again, there 
seems to be no evidence for so-called spear-phishing attacks 
on specific targets with lots of money. Apparently, these 
criminals are happy with anything they can get and do not 
discriminate between the rich and poor.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
B. Visibility (hypothesis 2) 
The visibility variables are divided into activities with high 
and low visibility. Regarding phishing, none of the activities 
with high visibility are related to victimization. Some of these 
activities, however, do appear to increase the risk of malware 
victimization. 
Perhaps the most obvious one is downloading. The more 
one downloads, the greater the chance of getting a malware 
infection. Other studies already showed downloading can be a 
risky activity. One of the ways to infect computers is by 
letting the user open a file which contaminates the computer. 
All the criminal has to do is make sure the user opens the file. 
This can be done by disguising malware as a nice picture or 
including it in the download of (what the users thinks is) the 
latest movie or software. Another option is that users are lured 
to websites which offer the latest downloads of whatever. As 
soon as the user enters the site, malware is transmitted. 
This last explanation might also be true for online games. 
This activity also increases the risk of victimization. Again, if 
users are actively looking for new games to play online, they 
might end up at infected sites which pretend to offer the latest 
online games. 
Buying goods online is another activity with high visibility 
which increases risk of malware victimization. A possible 
explanation can be found in the goal of malware: intercepting 
user credentials to commit fraud. People who buy more often 
online are also likely to pay more often online, or at least have 
to share their financial credentials more often online with the 
company or persons with whom the business is done. 
Attackers simply have more opportunities to intercept 
credentials.  
This last explanation is in line with the other type of online 
activities which enlarge chances of malware victimization: 
frequency of internet use, targeted and untargeted browsing. 
The more users carry out these common activities, the greater 
the chance of becoming a malware victim. When it comes to 
phishing victimization, only targeted browsing seemed to be 
risk enhancing. This was an unexpected finding with the 
possible explanation that not phishing, but malware infections 
caused this effect. Users can get contaminated by visiting 
infected websites. These website are not by definition located 
in the dark alleys of the internet. In recent years, for example, 
many popular, legitimate websites had advertisements which 
were contaminated and infected visitors to that website. The 
conclusion was that “Internet users who visit all kinds of 
(legitimate) sites are at greater risk.” This explanation is 
clearly being confirmed by the current analysis: being online, 
surfing the web (both targeted and untargeted) is a risk-
enhancing activity for malware infections.  
 
C. Accessibility (hypothesis 3-6) 
Again, when it comes to phishing victimization, none of 
the factors in relation to accessibility have a risk-increasing 
effect. This applies to both online accessibility (use of popular 
operating systems and web browsers) and protective measures 
to reduce accessibility (up-to-date virus scanner, computer 
knowledge and risk perception). Apparently, in the case of 
phishing, technical accessibility is not of major importance. 
This corresponds with the modus operandi of phishing 
networks covered in the introduction: technology is only used 
in the early stage of the crime; the major part of the crime 
script consists of using social engineering on victims. No 
large-scale, high-tech attacks, but tailored low-tech attacks.  
But what about malware? Table 1 shows that the use of a 
certain operating system and web browser is risk increasing. 
Users with a Windows operating system have an increased 
risk of malware victimization. This may be because this is a 
widely used operating system. It is simply more profitable for 
criminals to write malware for this system because there are 
more potential victims. It also appears that users have an 
increased risk of victimization with the Firefox browser. At 
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the time of data collection for this study this was the most 
popular browser after Internet Explorer.
6
 
Another technical aspect without any effect on both 
phishing and malware victimization is the use of a virus 
scanner. The conclusion made in 2014 article [1] remains 
intact: a virus scanner cannot guard against mail that 
persuades users to provide personal information (low-tech 
attack). It might protect against some forms of malware (high-
tech attack), but only to known variants. New variants are not 
detected (yet). Virus scanners also do not protect against 
criminals who abuse zero-day exploits (a flaw in software for 
which there is no patch at a certain moment). 
  
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
There are many similarities between (low-tech) phishing 
attacks and (high-tech) malware attacks. Both type of attacks 
have, for example, almost the same crime script. Furthermore, 
both groups of criminals are happy with anything they can get 
and do not discriminate between the rich and poor.  
There are also differences. Firstly, regarding the effect of 
online visibility, almost none of the variables had any effect 
on phishing victimization. The victims of malware, however, 
tell a different story. There is a clear connection between 
spending time in the online world and victimization. There are 
two types of activities which ensure a higher chance of 
becoming a victim, namely downloading and online gaming. 
The second difference can be found within online 
accessibility. Again, none of the variables mattered when it 
came to phishing. The malware analysis, however, shows that 
users with certain (popular and widely used) operating 
systems and web browsers do have an increased risk of 
victimization. 
What do these findings mean for situational crime 
prevention? The conclusion regarding phishing victimization 
was that everybody is at risk. Opportunities for prevention 
campaigns aimed at a specific target group or dangerous 
online activities are limited. Situational crime prevention will 
have to come from a different angle, for example, the banks 
taking on the role of capable guardian. 
At first glance, the malware analysis shows more 
opportunities for prevention campaigns aimed at specific 
groups because there are a number of variables which are risk 
enhancing. When we take a closer look, however, the analysis 
shows that obvious – and relatively easy to adjust – protective 
variables, like using a virus scanner, computer knowledge and 
online risk perception, have no effect on victimization.  
The risk seems to come from two different angles. The 
first one is spending more time online. Just visiting all sorts of 
(legitimate) websites is risk enhancing. More research on 
exactly how and where victims got infected has to be done, 
but in the light of routine activity theory it is expected that 
criminals aim their attacks at popular online places (like the 
recent infections of advertisements on popular websites). The 
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more visitors a website has, the larger the amount of potential 
victims. The second group who is at risk are people who are 
looking for downloads or online games. Again, the law of 
large number applies: popular downloads and games can be 
used to trick as many potential victims as possible to visit an 
infected website, or to download an infected file.  
These findings underline the conclusions of the 2014 
article [1]: situational crime prevention has to be aimed at 
other groups than just the users themselves. The malware 
analysis shows there is an important role for owners of 
(popular) websites. Indeed, criminals are interested in these 
online places and the owners of these places have to protect 
their visitors from getting infected.  
Furthermore, the current analysis points out the way for 
further (in-depth) studies. Firstly, classic methods like 
interviews with victims might shed light on some of the 
findings. What type of websites are the victims actually 
visiting? Do they know on which site or because of which 
download they got infected? Why did they visit that particular 
website? Did they have a feeling something was wrong? 
Subsequently, more pioneering methods like analyzing logs of 
user activity from Internet Service Providers or examining 
computers and browsers of users their selves by researchers 
might provide better insight into actual activities of victims. In 
addition to this, criminal networks need to be analyzed more 
systematically. Leukfeldt’s study [2] showed that criminal 
networks with the same crime script may have major 
differences in their nature (low-tech vs. high-tech). As the 
current analysis shows, this might affect the type of victim 
they target. Insight into what other types of networks there are 
(origin and growth, type and role of offenders, criminal 
capabilities, etc.) might give us insight in how these networks 
actually select their victims. 
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Table 1: Logistic regression of phishing and malware victims 
 Phishing [1] Malware [3] 
 B S.E. B S.E. 
Constant -10,685 3,176 -6.296*** .591 
Value     
 Personal income .000 .006 -.005** .001 
 Household income -.002 .007 .002 .001 
 Financial assets  .000 .001 .000 .000 
 Financial possessions .000 .001 .000 .000 
 Savings .000 .000 .000 .000 
Online visibility     
 Frequency of internet use .231 .498 .233** .091 
Online activities with low visibility     
 Targeted browsing .519* .253 .156** .048 
 Direct communication: e-mail .197 .199 -.049 .041 
 Direct communication: MSN. Skype .066 .151 -.020 .034 
Online activities with high visibility     
 Chatting in chat boxes .187 .208 -.015 .053 
 Online gaming -.006 .167 .084* .034 
 Active on online forums -.132 .261 .142 .051 
 Active on social network sites .135 .153 -.015 .034 
 Twitter -.024 .229 .014 .050 
 Downloading -.331 .331 .078* .033 
 Untargeted browsing .016 .144 .139*** .033 
 Buying online .159 .369 .387*** .084 
Digital accessibility     
 OS: Windows -.122 .649 .912*** .184 
 Browser: Internet Explorer -.115 .383 .125 .085 
 Browser: Google Chrome -.072 .360 .089 .076 
 Browser: Firefox .0353 .356 .173* .082 
 Browser: Opera .491 1.049 .289 .265 
 Browser: Safari .128 .636 -.362 .188 
 No virus scanner .255 .562 -.111 .154 
 Computer knowledge .643 .504 .167 .090 
 Online risk perception -.145 .266 -.007 .059 
Nagelkerke R2 5.0  8.4  
N 8,379  8,378  
* p<0,01; ** p<0,001 
 
 
